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I. INTRODUCTION
Damage awards in cases ranging from the explosion of a Ford Pinto1
2
and the repainting of a BMW automobile, to the temperature setting of a
McDonald's coffee maker,3 demonstrate the commitment of this country's
judicial and legislative bodies to punish defendants for their malicious,
wanton, or reckless acts. This feat has been accomplished through the use
of punitive damages.
1. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 389 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (awarding plaintiff $3.5 million in punitive damages as a result of defective
automobile manufacture, which directly contributed to the severity of the dam-
ages incurred by the plaintiff. The court allowed the award to stand, finding mal-
ice or corporate responsibility for malice.)
2. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994), rev'd, 116S.
Ct. 1589, 1592 (1996) (remanding case because $2 million punitive damage award
for fraud claim was "grossly excessive").
3. See Greene v. Boddie-Noell Ent., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 416, 418 & n.1 (W.D.
Va. 1997) (describing an Albuquerque, New Mexico state court's award of $2.7
million in punitive damages to an 81 year-old woman who was burned by hot cof-
fee she purchased at McDonald's).
1
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Recently, in Molenaar v. United Cattle Co.,4 the Minnesota Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether an award of punitive damages was
proper. In Molenaar, the court broke through a judicial wall which had
been erected around punitive damage awards by holding that such dam-
ages were appropriate in any non-products liability case where the defen-
dant's acts were made in a deliberate disregard for the rights and safety of
others.5 Departing from precedent, the Molenaar court ruled that the na-
ture of the injury (personal versus non-personal injury) was no longer
controlling in deciding whether punitive damages should be awarded.6
Rather, the court properly focused the analysis of punitive damages on the
defendant's conduct by stating that whenever a defendant acts in a mali-
cious, willful and reckless manner, an award of punitive damages may be
warranted.7 This case note will demonstrate why Molenaar was correct by
providing an overview of punitive damages, then analyzing the historical
purpose of punitive damages in England, the United States, and Minne-
sota, and finally analyzing the Molenaar decision in light of history, prece-
dent, and purpose.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES - AN OVERVIEW
Punitive damages are damages over and above the actual amount of
damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's wanton,s1..u 111
maicious,9 reckless or oppressive behavior." The main purposes of pu-
nitive damages awards are to punish a defendant for acting in such a
manner, to teach the defendant not to act that way again, and to deter
4. 553 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
5. See id. at 428.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Peterson v. Sorlein, 299 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Minn. 1980) (stating that a
plaintiff must prove a defendant acted wantonly before a court may award puni-
tive damages).
9. See Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. O'Connor & Hannan, 494
N.W.2d 261, 268 (Minn. 1992) (stating that "[a] mere showing of negligence is
not sufficient; instead, the conduct must be done with malicious, willful or reck-
less disregard for the rights of others.").
10. See id.
11. See Terfehr v. Kleinfehn, 352 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that "[p]unitive damages are not designed to compensate but rather to
punish the offender for his... oppressive conduct."); see also 1 LiNDA L.
SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITVE DAMAGES § 2.1 (A), at 22 (3d ed. 1995)
(citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1896)). A variety of terms have been used to
convey the concept of punitive damages, including smart money, exemplary dam-
ages, vindictive damages, speculative damages, imaginary damages, presumptive
damages or added damages. See id. at 21-22. The most common terms are puni-
tive and exemplary. See id. at 22.
[Vol. 24
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others from acting in a similar manner.'
The utilization of punitive damages has been the focus of a great
deal of controversy in the United States. Some jurisdictions defend the• 13
remedy and others oppose it. However, such awards are considered an
established component of the country's legal system, which the judiciary
does not appear to be abandoning any time soon.14
Similar to punitive damages, some jurisdictions have adopted the
statutory penalty of multiple damages. The statutory remedy of multiple
damages is similar to an award of punitive damages in that they both pro-
vide for awards in excess of the plaintiffs actual harm. 5 The concept of
16
multiple damages pre-dates punitive damages by several thousand years.
III. GENERAL HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The first recorded awards of punitive, or multiple, damages were
found in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi over 4000 years ago. 17 Both
personal and non-personal injury claims justified punitive damages. For
example, section eight of the Babylonian Code provided for punitive
damages of thirty times the value of an ox, sheep, ass, pig or goat if stolen
from a temple or palace, and ten times the value if stolen from a freed-18
man. In addition, references to awards of punitive damages for conver-
sion can also be found in the Hittite Law in 1400 B.C.,' 9 the Hindu Code
12. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 2,
at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted). Some courts have stated that an addi-
tional purpose of punitive damages is to reimburse the plaintiff for damages
which are not otherwise compensable, such as the expenses associated with bring-
ing a lawsuit or wounded feelings. See id.
13. See id. § 2, at 11-12; see also infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
14. SeeKEETONETAL., supra note 12, at 12.
15. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 1. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. §14-295 (1985) (providing for double or treble damages in cases involving
personal injury, wrongful death or damages to property as a result of certain traf-
fic violations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 939( c ) (allowing treble damages when
defendant willfully or maliciously destroys computer equipment); 815 ILL. COMp.
STAT. 710/13 (1995) (providing treble damages for unfair or deceptive trade act
violations where defendant acts willfully or wantonly); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§6700-608 (1976) (making provision for treble damages where a person is injured
by a violation of the Hearing Aid Sales Registration Law).
16. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 1. As it evolved from the
common law, the concept of multiple damages was used to meet certain societal
needs, including punishment, deterrence, and compensation for intangible
harms, as well as substitution for revenge. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, Supra note 11,
§1.0, at 1.
17. See GERALDW. BOSTON, PUNITIVE DAMAGESINTORT LAW § 1:2, at 2 (1993).
18. See id.; see also SCHLUETER& REDDEN, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 2 (providing
further examples of the awarding of punitive damages under Babylonian law).
19. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 2 & n.3. Under Hittite
law, if a person stole a "great" bull or horse, then he was forced to pay the owner
1998]
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of Manu in 200 B.C., 20 as well as in ancient Roman codes and writings.
21
The first modem adoption of punitive damages appeared in England
in 1763 in two conversion cases: Wilkes v. Wood2 and Huckle v. Money. 3 In
both cases, the courts awarded punitive damages against the defendants
for unwarranted searches and seizures of the plaintiffs' property in an ef-• . 24
fort to punish the defendants and to deter future misconduct. The doc-
trine of punitive damages had gained favor in England as an effort to
remedy social needs, which the common law had failed to meet.2' The
court in Wilkes stated that punitive damage awards should be given "not
only as a satisfaction of the injured person, but likewise as a punishment
to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a
proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself."
26
However, in 1964, the English courts curtailed the doctrine of puni-
tive damages by strictly limiting the circumstances under which such
awrstrulb ict.2ln thoe 28
awards could be given. In Rookes v. Barnard, the House of Lords limited
the then-existing law of punitive damages by holding that these types of
awards could only be given in cases involving: (1) oppressive, arbitrary or
unconstitutional action by the servants of the government versus a private
fifteen bulls or horses for his crime. See id.
20. See id. at 2 & n.4. The Hindu Code of Manu provided that in the case of
a theft, the thief would have to repay the owner multiple damages, depending
upon the value of the item that was stolen. See id.
21. See id. § 1.2, at 3. By the middle of the fifth century B.C., Roman law was
embodied in the Decemviral Code which was inscribed on the Twelve Tables. See
id. Sections of the Twelve Tables described many circumstances under which pu-
nitive damages were to be given, including cases involving dishonest tutors who
stole property from their students. See id.
22. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (KB. 1763).
23. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
24. See Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99 (upholding jury's 1,000 pound punitive
damages award); Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769 (upholding jury's 300 pound puni-
tive damages award).
25. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 1.3(A), at 7. English courts de-
veloped the theory of punitive damages to meet the following needs: (1) to be
able to justify excessive verdicts; (2) to be able to give awards for claims which
would not otherwise be compensable, such as claims for mental anguish; (3) to
deter wrongdoers; (4) to redress unequal punishment in the criminal law; and (5)
to prevent revenge. See id. at 7-11.
26. 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99. See generally Jonathan S. Massey, Why Tradition
Supports Punitive Damages: And How the Defense Bar Misreads History, 31 TRiAL 18
(Sept. 1995) (reviewing the historical tradition underlying punitive damages and
finding that the awards were not proportional to victim compensation, but rather
proportional to the need to punish and deter).
27. See SCHLUETER& REDDEN, supra note 11, § 1.3(A), at 12.
28. 1 All E.R. 367 (C.A. 1964). Many commentators believe that the land-
mark decision of Rookes v. Barnard "signaled a death blow to much of the doctrine
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corporation or individual; (2) a defendant's conduct that was calculated to
make a profit greater than the compensation he would be liable to pay the
plaintiff; or (3) an award expressly authorized by' a statute.2 The Rookes
holding continues as the current law in England.
IV. HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE UNITED STATES
Early American cases regarding punitive damages exhibited confu-
sion as to whether such damages were to be either penal or compensatory
in nature. In some cases, courts adopted both reasons as bases for its de-.. 32
cision. By the 1850s, however, the United States Supreme Court had a
clear vision of the purpose of punitive damages: "[i]t is a well-established
principle of the common law, that... a jury may inflict what are called...
vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his
offence [sic] rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff."3
Today in the United States, the most frequently stated purpose for
29. Rookes, 1 All E.R. at 410-11. Other countries with similar common law
traditions as England, such as Australia and Canada, continue to allow punitive
damage awards without significant limitation. See BOSTON, supra note 17, § 1:6 &
n.44.
30. See also AB. v. S. Water Servs., Ltd., 1 All E.R. 609, 615-24 (C.A. 1993)
(upholding the categories under which punitive damages are to be awarded as
enumerated in Rookes).
31. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 1.4(A), at 15 (explaining Amer-
ica's early interpretations and struggles in categorizing punitive damages). The
early American debate over the purpose of punitive damage awards is best illus-
trated in the writings of Theodore Sedgwick and Professor Simon Greenleaf, two
early American legal scholars. See id. at n.1. Sedgwick believed that exemplary
damages were warranted in cases involving actual loss and an aggravated wrong
which involved malice or fraud so as to punish the defendant for his actions. See
id. (citing 1 T. SEDGWICK, THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, §§360-69 at 706-26 (9th ed.
1912)). However, Professor Greenleaf believed that such damages were given
only to compensate the plaintiff for the actual damages suffered by him as a result
of the defendant's acts. See id. (citing 2 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE, §253, at 250
(15th ed. 1892)).
32. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 1.4(A), at 15 (stating that puni-
tive damages did not become penal in nature until the early 1800s). See also
McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, 437 (1845) (holding that "the jury may give exem-
plary damages, not only to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defen-
dant"); Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J. 77 (1791) (stating that, in an action regarding
breach of a promise to marry, the jury was charged not only to award damages
"for 'example's sake,' to prevent such offenses in [the] future" but also "to allow
liberal damages for the breach of a sacred promise") (emphasis in original).
33. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 370 (1852). See also City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-67 (1981) (supporting general claims of
punitive damages other than those brought against municipalities, because award-
ing damages in this setting would not serve either a retributive or a deterrent
function); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974) (holding that
punitive damages serve a non-compensatory function).
1998]
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awarding punitive damages is to punish defendants for their actions and
to deter defendants and others from engaging in similar conduct. 4How-
ever, some states still see punitive damages as having a compensatory func-5
tion.
The United States Supreme Court tends to defer to state precedents
when affirming punitive damage awards in state court proceedings.3 The
Supreme Court has also upheld punitive damages awards given in federal
37
court proceedings. In the recent decision of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip,M the Supreme Court held that common law awards of puni-
tive damages do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3 9
34. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 2.2(A) (1), at 28; (explaining
that "[b]ecause punishing the defendant is akin to the purpose of deterring both
him and others from such conduct, most courts that express this as a function of
punitive damages will combine these two ideas."); BOSTON, supra note 17, §§ 2.6-
2.9. The Second Restatement of Torts also states that punitive damages are in-
tended to punish and deter: "Punitive damages are damages, other than compen-
satory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outra-
geous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTs § 908(1) (1979).
35. See Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 435 (Conn. 1992) (stating that "[w]e
remain convinced that a rule limiting punitive damages awards to the expense of
litigation ... 'fulfills the salutory purpose of fully compensating a victim for the
harm inflicted on him while avoiding the potential for injustice which may result
from exercise of unfettered discretion by a jury.'") (citation omitted); Gilroy v.
Conway, 391 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (commenting that "[i]n
Michigan.... the purpose of exemplary damages has not been to punish the de-
fendant but to render the plaintiff whole by compensating for mental injury...
where such injury is the result of outrageous conduct.").
36. See Memphis Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 & n.9
(1986); Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 285 (1912); Minneapolis & St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 36 (1889).
37. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30. 32 (1983) (affirming an award of
punitive damages given pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983). Congress has statutorily
provided for punitive damage awards in a number of instances. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 303(i) (2) (B) (1994) (allowing punitive damages against a person filing a peti-
tion for bankruptcy under bad faith); 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (3) (1988) (providing
for punitive damages awards against any governmental agency or department that
discloses financial records in violation of Chapter 35); 26 U.S.C. §7431 (1) (B) (ii)
(1982) (prescribing punitive damages against any person who knowingly or negli-
gently discloses tax returns in violation of Section 6103).
38. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
39. See id. In Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, he makes special note of
the fact that punitive damage awards were "an established part of the American
common law of torts" even before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in
1896. Id. at 26.
[Vol. 24
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A. Punitive Damages Awards throughout the United States
There are only a limited number of states which either do not recog-
nize the award of punitive damages or only allow such awards if authorized
by statute.40 Of the states that permit punitive damages, most award dam-
ages in conversion claims if the defendant's conduct is willful, wanton or41
malicious. The most commonly stated purpose behind such awards is to
40. See N.H. REviEw STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1986) (stating "[n]o punitive dam-
ages shall be awarded in any action, unless otherwise provided by statute"); see gen-
erally Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 74 So. 541, 549 (La. 1917)
(holding that as there was no statutory authority proving for awards of punitive
damages in a wrongful death case, such damages could not be awarded); Boott
Mills v. Boston & M.R.R., 106 N.E. 680, 684 (Mass. 1914) (stating that punitive
damages may not be awarded minus a statute specifically providing for such
awards); Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975) (disallowing puni-
tive damages); Maki v. Aluminum Building Products, 436 P.2d 186, 187 (Wash.
1968) (disallowing awards of punitive damages on public policy grounds). Some
states hold that punitive damages may be awarded, but not in all circumstances.
See ALA. CODE § 6-11-29 (1987) (providing that punitive damages may not be
awarded in wrongful death actions). Further, some states have limited the size of
such awards. See COLO. REvIEw STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (1987) (limiting punitive
damage awards to the amount of actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a)
(West 1997) (limiting punitive damage awards to three times the amount of com-
pensatory damages). See generally STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, HIsToRIcAL
FICTION: PuNInvE DAMAGES, CHANGE, AND THE PoLITics OF IDEAS (American Bar
Foundation Working Paper No. 9618, 1996) (analyzing the patterns and changes
in punitive damages from the 1960s to the early 1990s in the context of political
tort reform).
41. See Derwinski v. Nichols, 671 So. 2d 86, 89 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995); Walter v.
Simmons, 818 P.2d 214, 225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); City Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith v.
Goodwin, 783 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Ark. 1990); Haines v. Parra, 239 Cal. Rptr. 178,
181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Flexisystems, Inc. v. Am. Testing Bureau Standards, Inc.,
847 P.2d 207, 208 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711, 714
(Del. 1972); Kenet v. Bailey, 679 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Pecan
Shoppe of Fredericksburg v. Bank of Dodge County, 457 S.E.2d 223, 224 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1995); Kunewa v. Joshua, 924 P.2d 559, 567 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996); Luzar v.
Western Surety Co., 692 P.2d 337, 343 (Idaho 1984); Hill v. Names & Addresses,
Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Chaiken v. Eldon Emmor & Co.,
Inc., 597 N.E.2d 337, 347-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d
388, 399 (Iowa 1994); Farmers State Bank, Simpson, Kansas v. FFP Operating
Partners, L.P., 935 P.2d 233, 236-37 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997); Hensley v. Paul Miller
Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Ky. 1974); DiPietro v. Boynton, 628 A.2d 1019,
1024 (Me. 1993); Kramer v. Levitt, 558 A.2d 760, 768 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1989);
West v. Combs, 642 So. 2d 917, 921 (Miss. 1994); S.L. Collins v. Trammell, 911
S.W.2d 635, 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); King v. Zimmerman, 878 P.2d 895, 901-02
(Mont. 1994); Wickliffe v. Fletcher Jones of Las Vegas, Inc., 661 P.2d 1295, 1296-
97 (Nev. 1983); Sommers v. McKinney, 670 A.2d 99, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996); Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Layton, 769 P.2d 84, 87 (N.M. 1989); War-
ner v. Village of Chatham, 598 N.Y.S.2d 863, 965-66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Taha v.
Thompson, 463 S.E.2d 553, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); W.W. Wallwork, Inc. v.
Duchscherer, 501 N.W.2d 751, 755 (N.D. 1993); Meacham v. Miller, 606 N.E.2d
19981
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punish the defendant and to deter the defendant and others from similar
future conduct.42
B. History of Punitive Damages in Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court first adopted the common law con-
43cept of punitive damages in a conversion case-Lynd v. Picket. In Lynd,
the court faced a creditor who had obtained a writ of attachment to con-
fiscate a debtor's property with full knowledge that the property was ex-44
empt. The court ruled that the creditor's knowledge exhibited a
"malicious motive" which allowed for an award of punitive damages.45
Lynd marked the beginning of a long line of Minnesota cases focused
on the defendant's conduct. Minnesota courts have permitted punitive
damage awards when a defendant has maliciously, willfully or recklessly
violated a 9erson's rights, regardless of whether a personal injury has been
sustained. In Minnesota, punitive damages have also been awarded in
conversion 7 actions time and time again.
996, 999 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Wagoner v. Bennett, 814 P.2d 476, 481 (Okla.
1991); Petra Perez Mem'l Senior Ctr. v. D.D. & E.M. Goodrich Enterprises, Inc.
833 P.2d 1336, 1337 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Pikunske v. Kopchinski, 631 A.2d 1049,
1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Carvalho v. Coletta, 457 A.2d 614, 616 (R.I. 1983);
Burbach v. Investors Management Corp. Int'l., 484 S.E.2d 119, 122 (S.C. Ct. App.
1997); Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W.2d 642, 652 (S.D. 1992); McCall v. Owens, 820
S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Taiwan Shrimp Farm Village Ass'n., Inc.
v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev., Inc., 915 S.W.2d 61, 72 (Tex. App. 1996); Lake Phil-
gas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Murray v.J & B Int'l Trucks, Inc., 508 A.2d 1351, 1355 (Vt. 1986); Peacock Buick,
Inc. v. Darkin, 277 S.E.2d 225, 228 (Va. 1981); Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 164
S.E.2d 710, 716 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1968); Shopko Stores, Inc. v. Kujak, 433 N.W.2d
618, 622 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
42. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
43. 7 Minn. 128, 7 Gil. 128 (1862).
44. Id. at 132.
45. See id. at 144 (stating that "[iut was a gross outrage upon the rights of
plaintiff, which the law does not tolerate, and justly allows damages by way of pun-
ishment and example.")
46. See Bucko v. First Minn. Sav. Bank, 471 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1991)
(granting punitive damages in a case involving polygraph testing); Advanced
Training Sys. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 1984) (awarding pu-
nitive damages in a libel case); Jensen v. Peterson, 264 N.W.2d 139, 145 (Minn.
1978) (allowing punitive damages in a fraud case); Huebsch v. Larson, 191
N.W.2d 433, 435 (Minn. 1971) (allowing punitive damages in conversion case); see
generally Gary J. Haugen & Joel A. Nurre, Punitive Damages: Juries' Hardball Meets
Legislative Bat, 50 BENCH & BAR 20 (April 1993) (analyzing Minnesota punitive
damage awards and finding that the frequency and severity of such awards in-
creased in this state during the 1970s and 1980s).
47. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 8.2 (A), at 441 (defining con-
version as an "unauthorized exercise of dominion and control over personal
property of another to the exclusion of the owner's rights"). Generally, conver-
[Vol. 24
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In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a punitive damages stat-
ute49 in an attempt to 1) remedy judicial confusion by codifying the then
existing case law on punitive damages5° and 2) limit the frequency of such
awards.
First, prior to the statute's adoption, the courts struggled under the
common law to determine which state of mind the defendant had to pos-
sess in order to justify an award of punitive damages. 51 By enacting this
statute, the legislature defined the state of mind required to justify an
award of punitive damages. Originally, the statute required a "willful in-
difference to the rights or safety of others."M But, in 1990 the legislature
focused the statutory standard of conduct necessary for an award of puni-
tive damages to a "deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others."5
sion of property will take one of three forms: (1) wrongfully taking the property of
another; (2) using or executing ownership rights over another's property without
proper authority; or, (3) wrongfully detaining the property of another after the
owner has demanded its return. See id. at 442.
48. See Huebsch, 191 N.W.2d at 435 (granting punitive damages for claim of
conversion of cattle); Matteson v. Munroe, 83 N.W. 153, 154 (Minn. 1900)
(awarding punitive damages for claim of conversion of seed grain); Lynd, 7 Minn.
at 201 (allowing punitive damages for claim of conversion of horses); Minnesota
Valley Country Club v. Gill, 356 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding
punitive damages for claim of conversion of corporate assets). Some commenta-
tors believe that punitive damages are appropriate in any conversion case where a
defendant either intentionally or wantonly and willfully exhibits a disregard for a
plaintiffs property rights. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 11, § 8.2(A) at
443. See also Walker v. Brown, 501 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1987); Killian v. Trans
Union Leasing Corp., 657 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex. App. 1983).
49. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1978); see also Gary J. Haugen & Howard B.
Tarkow, Punitive Damages in Minnesota: The Common Law and Developments Under
Section 549.20 of the Minnesota Statutes, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REviEw 353 (1985)
(providing an extensive discussion of the 1978 version of § 549.20). Commenta-
tors view this statute as official recognition of the appropriateness of punitive
damages awards under certain egregious circumstances. See James H. Kaster &
Michael L. Weiner, Punitive Damages in Minnesota, 20 MINN. TRIAL LAW. 16 (Fall
1995).
50. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 891 (Minn.
1986) (holding that the intent of § 549.20 was to codify the then-existing law on
punitive damages). While this statute deals broadly with awards of punitive dam-
ages in all civil cases, the legislature has enacted additional statutes which deal
with such awards under more specific circumstances. See MINN. STAT. § 169.121,
subd. 10a (1995) (providing that proof of a blood alcohol level of .10 or above is
sufficient for the trier of fact to consider punitive damages); MINN. STAT. §
176.183, subd. 2 (1995) (providing that punitive damage awards may be awarded
under the Workers' Compensation Act against a non-insured employer); MINN.
STAT. § 363.071 (1996) (allowing punitive damages in employment discrimination
cases).
51. See Kaster & Weiner, supra note 49, at 16.
52. See id.
53. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1 (1978).
54. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1(a) (1990). The statute was further
1998]
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Second, the legislature was concerned about the increasing number
of punitive damage awards. During the original legislative debate over the
enactment of this statute, the Senate judiciary committee heard testimony
that expressed concern about the national trend toward the increasing
frequency and amount of punitive damage awards in products liability• 51
cases that existed at that time. Mindful of the legislature's fear, Minne-
sota courts have utilized this statute to limit the amount of such awards.
5 6
In 1980, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Cor-
poration5 7 unequivocally held that punitive damages were appropriate in
58
strict products liability cases. This case involved a small child who was
severely burned when her defectively manufactured "flannelette" pajamas
caught on fire.59 The supreme court held that the egregious conduct of
the defendant in manufacturing and marketing a knowingly unsafe prod-60
uct warranted the jury's award of punitive damages. In Gryc, the court
amended at this time to provide a definition of "deliberate disregard":
A defendant has acted with deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of
others if the defendant has knowledge of facts or intentionally disregards
facts that create a high probability of injury to the rights or safety of oth-
ers and:
(1) deliberately proceeds to act in conscious or intentional disregard of
the high degree of probability of injury to the rights or safety of others;
or
(2) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the high probability
of injury to the rights or safety of others.
MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1(b) (1990).
55. See Dianne C. Heins, Statutory Changes in Minnesota Tort Law - 1978, 48
HENNEPIN LAw. 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1978) (stating that the representatives of the insur-
ance and product manufacturing industry lobbied the Minnesota legislature to
enact various tort reform measures, including a punitive damages statute, so as to
cure what they termed a "products liability crisis"). At the time Minnesota's puni-
tive damages statute was enacted, Ms. Heins was serving as counsel to the Minne-
sota Senate Judiciary Committee. See id.
56. See Minn.-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n., 294
N.W.2d 297, 311 (Minn. 1980) (stating that the legislature's purpose in enacting §
549.20 was to limit the frequency and amount of punitive damages awards). See
also Heins, supra note 55 at 7 (stating that the legislature ultimately rejected a
proposed provision of §549.20 that would have permitted the trial judge, not the
jury, to award punitive damages.)
57. 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980).
58. See id. at 733; see also BOSTON, supra note 17, § 19.13, at 31-33 (providing a
synthesis of judicial decisions throughout the country dealing with punitive dam-
age awards in product liability cases).
59. Giyc, 297 N.W.2d at 729.
60. See id. at 739-41. The court focused on the following specific acts of the
defendant in affirming the jury's verdict of punitive damages: (1) that the defen-
dant created a considerable danger to the public by marketing an unsafe product;
(2) it continued to market this product even though there were economically fea-
sible ways of making it safer; and (3) it was aware of the danger its product posed
and the means for correcting it. See id. at 741.
[Vol. 24
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss1/6
MOLENAAR V. UNITED CATTLE COMPANY
focused on the defendant's conduct when it affirmed the jury's award of
punitive damages.61
Two years later, in Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Company,"
the supreme court faced another punitive damages claim in the context of.... 63
a strict products liability case. The case involved both a wrongful death.. .. .64
claim as well as a products liability claim for property damage. However,
because neither claim involved the sort of personal injury as in Gryc, the
65
supreme court denied the parties' claims for punitive damages.
In Eisert, gasoline stored in a high school auto body shop caught fire
as students were working on an automobile fuel tank. Two students died
67
from inhaling toxic smoke. The high school brought a strict products
liability action against the manufacturers and distributors of the school's
spray foam insulation and intumescent paint for its property damage, al-
leging that these products fueled the fire and created toxic smoke. The
deceased students' families brought their wrongful death claims against
the manufacturer under the same theories. 69 Yet, when the parties at-
tempted to amend their complaints to add a claim for punitive damages,
70
the trial court denied the motion.
In the first case to focus on a plaintiffs injuries, as opposed to a de-
fendant's conduct, the Minnesota Supreme Court limited punitive dam-
age awards to only those strict products liability cases involving personal
injuries in Eisert. In upholding the trial court's denial of the school dis-
trict's motion to amend the complaint, the supreme court stated,
"[w]here [an] injury is limited to property damage, the public interest in
punishment and deterrence is largely satisfied by the plaintiffs recovery of
compensatory damages. " 72 Contrary to the language of the statute, the
court held that "[a]lthough the nature of the plaintiffs injury is not always
listed as a factor in determining how to assess punitive damages.... it may
reasonably be taken into account in deciding where punitive damages will
,73be allowed .... .. The court further denied the decedent families' mo-
61. See id. at 739.
62. 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982).
63. See id. at 227.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 229.





71. See id. at 229.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citations omitted). The court based its decision on one line taken
from the eighteen page decision in Giyc wherein the court stated that "the state
punitive damages remedy concerns the vital state interest of protecting persons
against personal injury." Id. (quoting Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d
1998]
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tion because, at that time, Minnesota's wrongful death statute did not
provide for punitive damages.74
The Eisert holding was later expanded by the supreme court in Inde-
pendent School District No. 622 v. Keene Corp. 7  In Keene, a school district
brought a products liability suit against an asbestos manufacturer for the
property damage it sustained in the asbestos abatement process, alleging
not only strict liability, but negligence, breach of implied warranties,
breach of express warranties, fraud, restitution, and conspiracy.76 In re-
versing the decisions of the trial court and court of appeals, the supreme
court ruled that the Eisert holding applied not only to products liability
cases involving claims of strict liability, but also to claims involving other
77theories of products liability where only property damage is suffered and
thus barred the school district's claim for punitive damages in this case.78
Like the court in Eisert, the Keene court focused on the plaintiff's injury in
determining whether punitive damages could be awarded.
In Soucek v. Banham,79 the Minnesota Court of Appeals further ex-
panded on the holding in Keene.80 Soucek involved a plaintiff whose dog
had been shot by the Minneapolis police after it had escaped from the
727, 737 (Minn. 1980)).
74. See Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 228
(Minn. 1982). It is interesting to note that at the time of this decision, Minne-
sota's wrongful death statute did not provide for an award of punitive damages.
See MrNN. STAT. § 573.02 (1978). However, shortly after the Eisert decision was
handed down, the statute was amended to allow for such claims. See MINN. STAT. §
573.02, subd. 1 (1983). The legislative purpose behind this amendment has been
expressed as follows:
As the purpose of wrongful death statutes is to allow heirs to bring claims
which the decedent would have been entitled to, and as the purpose of
the punitive damages statute is to punish and deter dangerous behavior,
it seems only logical that conduct resulting in death should allow for
such recovery. It was for these reasons that in 1983 the wrongful death
statute was specifically amended to read "Punitive damages may be
awarded as provided in §549.20."
Kaster & Weiner, supra note 49, at 22 (emphasis in original). Prior to the amend-
ment, the statute limited a recovery of damages to only those proportionate to the
plaintiff's pecuniary loss. See id.
75. 511 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1994).
76. See id. at 729.
77. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Corp., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984)
(noting that there are other theories of products liability recovery other than
strict liability, such as the negligence-based design defect and failure to warn
theories).
78. See Keene, 511 N.W.2d at 732. The court held "[w]e believe now as we did
in Eisert that denying punitive damages where a plaintiff only suffers property
damage reflects the greater importance society places on protecting people." Id.
79. 524 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 25,
1995).
80. See id. at 480-81.
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plaintiff's yard."' The plaintiff sued the officers and the City of Minneapo-
lis alleging negligence per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision.
The plaintiff then brought a motion to amend his complaint to add a
claim for punitive damages.8 3 After initially granting the motion, the trial
court reversed itself based upon the Keene decision. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling in a split decision, stating that "[g] iven the
supreme court's rationale in Keene, we see no basis for distinguishing tor-
tious conduct in the production or distribution of a product from other
tortious conduct."8 5 The court of appeals then held that punitive damages
were prohibited in any case that did not involve a personal injury.86
A little over a year and a half after Soucek was decided, the supreme
court heard the case of Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co. In
this case, the plaintiff brought an employment discrimination claim
against the defendant." After the bench trial was completed, the trial
judge awarded the plaintiff double the amount of her actual damages in89
addition to punitive damages. The supreme court affirmed the trial
judge's awards of both punitive and "double actual" damages even though
the plaintiff did not assert that she had sustained a personal injury.90
With the issuance of the Phelps decision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court signaled a possible return to the original purpose behind this state's
enactment of the punitive damages statute by focusing on the defendant's
egregious conduct when making such awards rather than on the nature of
the plaintiffs injury.91
V. THE MOLENAAR DECISION
A. The Facts
In 1994, Orville Molenaar ("Molenaar") purchased sixty-five heifers,




85. Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), review
denied, (Minn.Jan. 25, 1995).
86. See id. at 480-81.
87. 537 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1995).
88. See id. at 273.
89. See id. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides that if a defendant is
found guilty of employment discrimination, the plaintiff may be awarded up to
three times the amount of his or her actual damages. See MINN. STAT. § 363.071,
subd. 2 (1992).
90. Phelps, 537 N.W.2d at 277.
91. See id.; see also supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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which he brought to Michael Frank's ("Frank") establishment to be
boarded.92 Frank also boarded cattle for other owners, one of which was
United Cattle Company ("United"). 3
In October 1994, after Frank and United had a falling out, United
obtained a replevin order 94 for the return of its cattle. 95 Representatives of
United arrived at Frank's farm to take possession of the number of cattle
listed in the order.(6 Although Frank informed the representatives that
some of the cattle they were taking belonged to Molenaar, the representa-
tives nonetheless took all the cattle and told Frank they could sort out the
details later.
97
After being notified that his cattle were now in the possession of
United, Molenaar repeatedly asked United for their return. A little over
one month later, United sold Molenaar's cattle.9 The parties were unable
to trace the cattle after the sale. 00
Molenaar sued United for conversion alleging that United's actions
101
caused him to suffer severe financial injury. Molenaar later amended102
his complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. After having ruled
in Molenaar's favor, the jury awarded him $400,000 in punitive damages
and $59,375 in compensatory damages. 103 United moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") on liability, compensatory damages104
and punitive damages. The district court granted JNOV on just the pu-
92. See Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn. Ct. App.),
review denied, (Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
93. See id.
94. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a replevin ac-
tion as "[a]n action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of
goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrong-
fully detained or taken or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels.").
95. See Molenaar, 553 N.W.2d at 426.
96. See id. at 426.
97. See id.
98. See Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn. Ct. App.),
review denied, (Minn. Oct. 15, 1996). Molenaar contacted United's attorneys as
well as its vice president in an attempt to locate his cattle, but no one would tell




102. See id. Minnesota Statute Section 549.191 provides that "[u]pon com-
mencement of a civil action, the complaint must not seek punitive damages. Af-
ter filing the suit a party may make a motion to amend the pleadings to claim pu-
nitive damages." MINN. STAT. § 549.191 (1996). Prior to the enactment of this
statute, a claim for punitive damages could be included in the complaint. See
Haugen & Nurre, supra note 46, at 20.
103. See Molenaar, 553 N.W.2d at 426.
104. See Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn. Ct. App.),
review denied, (Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
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nitive damages claim.' °5 Molenaar appealed the JNOV regarding his puni-
tive damages award and United cross-appealed the district court's denial
of JNOV on its two remaining claims. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
reinstated the jury's punitive damage award while upholding the trial
court's denial ofJNOV on the remaining two claims.
07
B. The Court's Analysis
In making its decision, the court of appeals in Molenaar began by re-
viewing Minnesota's extensive history of punitive damages awards as well• 108
as the general purpose behind such awards. In noting that "[p]unitive
damages awards have been permitted in conversion actions since the for-
mation of thi[is] state," the court commented that "[p] ermitting punitive
damages in these actions demonstrates the state's strong policy against
malicious, willful, or reckless disregard of another's property rights."
The court then traced the more recent history of punitive dam-
ages."0 The court stated that it interpreted the supreme court's holding
in Phelps as limiting the language contained in Keene which prohibited pu-
nitive damages from being awarded in non-personal injury cases."' It
held that the Keene decision applied only to products liability cases and
that Phelps was a return to the premise that punitive damages are to be
awarded whenever a defendant acts with willful indifference to the rights,
not just safety, of others." 2 The court stated that this holding would bring
the case law on punitive damages back in line with the purpose of the pu-
nitive damages statute - to punish for the willful and deliberate disregard
of another's rights as well as another's safety - and that to rule otherwise
would "eviscerate [part of] the statute."
13
The court of appeals also concluded that its reading of the Phelps and
Keene decisions was consistent with the philosophy underlying an award of
punitive damages, which is "'to both punish and deter accordin 4to the
gravity of the act giving rise to a punitive damage award .... The
court properly concluded that "[t]he focus lies on the defendant's wrong-
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 430.
108. Id. at 427-30.
109. See id. at 427; see also supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
110. SeeMolenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. Ct. App.),
review denied, (Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
111. See id. The opinion stated that "Keene stands for the proposition that
'[a]bsent personal injury, a party injured by a product may not recover punitive
damages.'" (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 428-29.
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ful conduct that must be deterred, not the specific outcome of the con-
duct."' 5
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court ruled that United's actions
in seizing and selling Molenaar's cattle after having been informed of the
identity of their true owner demonstrated United's intentional violation of• , 116
Molenaar's property rights. Thus, the court reinstated the jury's deter-
mination that punitive damages were appropriate in this case and re-
manded the case back to the trial court to make specific findings as re-
quired under Minnesota Statute section 549.20.117
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE MOLENAAR DECISION
The controlling factor in awarding punitive damages is the severity
and willfulness of the defendant's conduct, not the type of injury suffered. .. 118
by the plaintiff. The object of punitive damages is to deter and punish
wrongful types of behavior." 9 In Molenaar, the court correctly adhered to
these principles when it held that punitive damages should be awarded in
non-personal injury cases where the defendant's conduct exhibited the• . 120
requisite degree of wantonness and disregard for the rights of others.
The Eisert decision clearly deviated from the above standard. 2 1 With
this decision, a Minnesota appellate court for the first time looked to the12
injury of the plaintiff for guidance in awarding punitive damages. The
115. See Molenaar, 553 N.W.2d at 429. The court added that without punitive
damages, a defendant who intentionally violates the property rights of another
has little to fear as the worst that could happen would be that he or she would
have to return the converted property; " [u]niversal abolition of punitive damages
for property damage dramatically improves the profitability of theft and dimin-
ishes society's reenforcement of personal accountability." Id.
116. SeeMolenaarv. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. Ct. App.),
review denied, (Minn. Oct. 15, 1996).
117. See id. In awarding punitive damages, Minnesota Statute section 549.20
requires that the trial court make specific findings as to (1) the seriousness of the
defendant's misconduct; (2) the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant;
(3) the duration of the misconduct and any concealment thereof; (4) the degree
of the defendant's awareness of the hazard; (5) the attitude and conduct of the
defendant; (6) the number and level of employees involved in the misconduct;
(7) the defendant's financial condition; and (8) the effect of other punishment of
the defendant including compensatory damages and criminal penalties. See
MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3 (1996).
118. Seesupra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text; see also Barnes v. Logan,
122 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that Molenaar"seems to be a more sen-
sible interpretation of Keene" as it limits it to products liability cases and permits
punitive damages for the deliberate disregard of another's rights).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 62-73.
122. See Haugen & Tarkow, supra note 49, at 363-65 (stating "[t]he [Eisert]
court's focus on the nature of the plaintiff's injury, rather than on the conduct of
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court's holding in Eisert appears to be influenced by the fact that at the
time of that decision, punitive damages could not be awarded in wrongful
death claims because the wrongful death statute did not explicitly provide
for such damages. 12 The court more than likely found it very difficult to
reconcile allowing punitive damages for a strict products liability property
damage claim when it could not do so for the deaths of two 
teenagers.
As such, the court developed a new line of reasoning to apply when decid-
ing whether punitive damages could be awarded. The court stated that
one must look to the injury of the plaintiff and no longer strictly at the
conduct of the defendant. This shifting was improper and served to ab-
rogate the main purpose behind Minnesota's punitive damages 
statute.126
If the court in Eisert had difficulty in applying the punitive damages statute
in the manner in which it was intended, it should have put out a call to
the legislature to amend the wrongful death statute instead of judicially
127
modifying the purpose of the punitive damages statute.
Likewise, the decisions in Keene and Soucek were incorrectly de-
cided.1 28  In both cases, the court focused on the plaintiffs damages
rather than on the degree of the defendant's conduct. r2 By doing so, the
courts again deviated from the design of the punitive damages statute and
the defendant, ignores the 120-year-old law of punitive damages" and was the first
case to do so). Other Minnesota Supreme Court decisions also suggest that the
Eisert decision was a clear departure from the well-settled principles surrounding
an award of punitive damages. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry &
Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Minn. 1983) (stating that courts should
consider the degree of malice, intent or willful disregard of the defendant in ap-
proving punitive damages awards); Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324 N.W.2d
652, 654 (Minn. 1982) (concluding the trial court properly looked to the nature
of the defendant's conduct in holding that punitive damages could not be added
to the plaintiffs claim); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 150-51 (Minn.
1980) (focusing on the defendant's intentional killing of the plaintiffs pet when
approving the jury's punitive damages award). But see Molenaar, 553 N.W.2d at
428 (stating that Gyc was the first case to shift the focus regarding punitive dam-
ages).
123. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
124. See Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 228-
29 (Minn. 1982) (stating that while it might be unfair to deny punitive damages
for the wrongful death of a person, Minnesota still puts more value "on the safety
of persons than it does on the security of property").
125. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
127. See In re Copeland, 455 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (stating
that "[t]he fundamental aim of an appellate court construing a statute is to ascer-
tain and give effect to the legislative intent."); see also State v. Wagner, 555 N.W.2d
752, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a "statute is to be construed in a
manner giving effect to all of its provisions and a construction that would give no
effect to the statute is to be avoided").
128. See supra text accompanying notes 75-86.
129. See id. notes 78, 84-85 and accompanying text.
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the legislature's intent.'30
By contrast, the Molenaar decision restores the proposition that the
defendant's conduct is what controls an award of punitive damages.131
This decision adheres to the true purpose of the punitive damages statute
that has been developed not only in this state, but in other states as well.1
32
If the legislature had intended that punitive damages were to apply only to
personal injury claims, it would have so provided in drafting the punitive
damages statute.13 3 However, the language of the statute clearly states that
malicious or oppressive acts which infringe upon the rights or safety of
others warrant the award of punitive damages.
VII. CONCLUSION
Minnesota has a long history of awarding punitive damages where a
plaintiff's rights, not just physical safety, have been invaded by a defen-
dant who acts in a willful and malicious manner. By focusing on this his-
tory and the purpose behind Minnesota's punitive damages statute, the
Molenaar court righted prior judicial holdings on this subject by returning
the court's focus to the character and extent of the defendant's conduct,
not the injury of the plaintiff. Thus, the Molenaar court correctly held that
punitive damages are to be awarded in any case, other than one for prod-
ucts liability, where the defendant's conduct exhibits a deliberate disre-
gard for the rights and safety of others regardless of the type of injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff.
Tracy M. Borash
130. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
133. See MnqN. STAT. § 549.20 (1996). Minnesota's punitive damages statute
does not contain any language providing that its provisions are to be applied
solely to personal injury claims.
134. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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